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ABSTRACT 
Since 1998, the defense budget has risen steadily but force structure has not. There are 
fewer ships, aircraft and personnel in the Department of the Navy (DoN) today despite 
nearly 42% budget growth. This differs markedly from the periods of growth during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s when force structure increased along with increased Navy 
budgets. 
Over the years, plenty of attention has been paid to how much the Department of 
Defense spends annually in budget allocations and force structure.  However, very little 
attention has been given to the area of increasing budgets with decreasing force structure.  
One barrier to such an investigation of increasing budgets and decreasing force structures 
is a consistent method by which analysts and policy makers may compare budget and 
force structure changes (growth and decline) longitudinally. This study introduces a 
baseline of historical and contextual information for defense leaders who are concerned 
about a likely decline in their budget.  This study also introduces an analysis and 
comparison of budget and force structure data over time to assist policy makers in their 
analysis and decision-making process when evaluating and developing budgets. 
The purpose of this project is to conduct a comparative analysis of the last two 
periods of sustained budget growth and its interceding period of decline for the 
Department of the Navy, describe corresponding changes in force structure, and propose 
possible explanations. Finally, this paper provides specific recommendations for areas of 
future research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
On August 9, 2010, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates announced that 
the Department of Defense (DoD) would spend $100 billion less on overhead in the next 
five years. The goal was not to reduce the DoD top line, but to reduce excess overhead 
costs and apply savings to force structure and modernization. According to Secretary 
Gates, while the U.S. faces significant economic challenges and growing budget deficits, 
defense base funding must sustain its growth to maintain its force structure and 
modernization, and it will require a 2–3% real growth in the DoD’s defense budget. The 
current and future defense budgets project a steady, modest growth of only 1% per year, 
and this initiative will make up the difference.  
Since 1998, the DoD budget has grown by 73% in constant 2010 dollars 
(CY2010$), but its force structure has not. Specifically, there are fewer ships, 
submarines, aircraft, and personnel in the Department of the Navy (DoN) today, despite 
the budget growth. This differs markedly from the period of growth during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, when force structure increased along with defense budgets.  
The defense budget top line has followed a cyclical pattern since WWII. The 
concern of senior defense officials is that the budget—currently above the peak of the last 
cycle—will soon fall, and the nation’s investment in defense will result in a lesser force 
structure.  
Figure 1 displays the real growth in DoD and DoN’s budget authority since 1975 
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Figure 1.  DoD and DoN Total B/A (From Comptroller, 2010) 
Based on the peaks and troughs of the DoD’s and DoN’s budget authority (B/A) 
over the past 35 years, periods of sustained growth occurred from 1975–1985 and 1998–
2010. During the intervening period, 1985–1998, defense budgets fell. 
The purpose of this project is to analyze the changes in the budget authority for 
the DoD and the DoN, and determine how they have affected the force structure 
composition over the last two periods of sustained budget growth and the interceding 
period of decline. The project will illustrate changes in force structure and propose 
possible explanations for these changes. The analysis of these three periods will answer 
the following research questions: 
 What insights can a comparative analysis of two periods of sustained 
budget growth and an interceding period of budget decline for the DoN 
provide?   
 What were the changes in the DoN’s budget allocations, and what were 
their effects on force structure?  
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The goal of this study is to establish a base level of data for defense decision-
makers, and provide a starting point for further interpretation and comparison in 
subsequent research. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While analysts have studied several aspects of the federal budget and DoD 
spending over the years, they have often neglected comparing historical trends over 
different periods within DoN budgets and spending.  One academic work claims the 
DoD’s past budgetary experience could lay a framework for the future, as there exists a 
rising national concern over budget priorities. Candreva and Brook argue that the top line 
of defense budgets responds to internal and external factors.  The authors point out that: 
Simply identifying the trends of the last 50 years does not mean that those 
trends will apply to the next three to five years.  We do not have the 
knowledge to make a point prediction.  More than a long-term average is 
needed and there are other factors that may affect the top line. (Candreva, 
2007) 
The focus of this study is not to forecast the direction the defense budgets in the 
next three to five years, but to simply provide a descriptive analysis of the behavior of the 
defense budget and to understand the nature of DoD and DoN spending during these 
three periods. 
Franklin Spinney, an Air Force military analyst in the Pentagon who retired in 
2003, authored the “Spinney Report.” This report was his lifelong work, and it criticized 
the Pentagon for its acquisition of expensive weapons systems that were more costly and 
less effective than previous systems.  Spinney stated that the Pentagon and DoD grossly 
and negligently pursued expensive and complex weapons systems with no regard for 
future budgetary implications. This goes to the mindset of military budgeting in that 
investment accounts affect other appropriation accounts, much to the detriment of 
expense accounts.  Spinney also developed an analysis of the military decision making 
process, and how it influences the readiness of U.S. forces.  He described how those 
forces were structured, and what factors drove up the costs of individual weapon systems.  
He pointed out that the complex equipment procured is so expensive to operate and 
  4
maintain that the US can afford far fewer than necessary, which results in a steady 
shrinkage in the size of U.S. forces over the years (Spinney, 1985).  The long-term 
consequences of short-term decisions have resulted in a mismatch between plans and 
reality, even with an increased defense budget. If past patterns of spending are not 
changed, U.S. defense problems may get worse instead of better (Spinney, 1985).  
Spinney goes on to argue that short-term decisions to increase procurement budgets to 
modernize with costly weapons have resulted in severe cuts in operating budgets. 
Therefore, training, maintenance, and other support factors necessary for high readiness 
have been neglected (Spinney, 1985).  In addition, his analysis furthers the point raised 
by Candreva and Brook; internal and external factors in the Pentagon, Congress, and the 
defense industry have created a desire for higher technology, and that has created long-
term consequences for DoD planners and the force structure of the military. 
Jones and McCaffery (2008) introduce the basics of the federal budgeting process 
and provide a historical background on its foundation. They describe both the 
measurement and analysis of defense spending.  They also look at how the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process operates, and how it should 
function to produce the annual defense budget proposal to Congress. According to Jones 
and McCaffery (2008), the role of Congress is to debate and decide on defense 
appropriations and the politics of the budgetary process to fund national defense. They 
also discuss budget execution dynamics its principal participants in the Pentagon and 
other military commands, and they assess DoD financial management and business 
practice challenges and issues.   
Analysts have studied many aspects of federal budget execution over the years, 
but the story of the increase and decrease from one time period to another within different 
budget accounts, with respect to the Department of the Navy, is yet untold.  What 
happened within the Navy’s budget that explains the vicissitudes of budget authority 
from 1975 to 2010?  According to Jones and Bixler (1992), problems in contemporary 
national defense, budgeting, and management include the following:   
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(1) Savings made by cutting deeply into the defense budget without sacrificing 
military force structure or the capacity to meet national security requirements and 
international commitments; 
(2) Basic assumptions upon which DoD budgetary strategy rests are overly 
pessimistic, ill informed, and out of date. This results in poor force structure planning and 
decision making, the purchase of the wrong military hardware, and widespread misuse of 
military and civilian personnel;  
(3) Mismanagement of RDT&E, Acquisition, and Procurement by the DoD has 
resulted in cost overruns, gold-plating, and the inoperability and poor maintenance of 
capital assets. 
Jones and Bixler (1992) wrote at the end of the last sustained period of budget 
growth and hypothesized that “organizational smoothing of reduction over a multiyear 
period accommodates fiscal restraint more effectively than quick cuts.”  They said that 
even during the “boom or bust years,” if the President and Congress would have used a 
multi-year approach to reduce “slow spend out accounts” (large acquisitions programs) 
instead of “fast spend out accounts” (personnel and operations and maintenance), the 
DoD could have realized a greater and more efficient savings in the end.  They also found 
that specific individual perspectives determined the view of savings as efficient or 
inefficient.  Congressional representatives with constituents affected by the DoD 
reduction are bound to look for other places to reduce the DoD budget that will not affect 
their constituents.  Members of the DoD will question the sustainability or ability to 
accomplish the missions of the military when facing a long-term “organizational 
smoothing.”  In addition, those making cuts in procurement and investment accounts will 
have to consider the long-term effects on the quality and quantity of deployable military 
force structure.  
John A. Williams, a Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago 
and an academic on civil-military relations and military forces and missions, wrote that 
the DoN will normally choose “quality over quantity” and that “[DoN] missions and 
forces are interrelated and missions should determine forces, but force structures cannot 
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be altered cheaply or quickly” (Williams, 1981).  He identified five elements (cost, long 
lead times, long lifetimes, need for growth potential, and level of risk) that determine the 
equipment purchased by the Navy. This, in principle, will determine the force structure of 
the DoN (Williams, 1981).  DoN ships, aircraft, and weapons systems are incredibly 
complex and expensive. They require personnel to build, test, and maintain them, 
sometimes for several decades.  The life expectancy of just one DoN ship is 25 to 30 
years, and this does not include a service life extension program to keep the ship sea 
worthy.  Despite the fact that Professor William’s article is nearly three decades old, the 
sentiment still holds true today. The weapons systems and capital assets purchased today 
will determine the number and size of our military personnel forces tomorrow and far 
into the twenty-first century.     
The law requires the DoN to provide Congress with an annual shipbuilding report 
that looks out over the next 30 years.  The latest report, issued in February for the 
FY2011 plan (Director, Warfare Integration, 2010) contains some distinct changes in the 
Navy’s long-term goals for shipbuilding when compared to the 2009 plan (no 2010 plan 
was produced).  The 2009 shipbuilding plan visualized the purchase of 40 more combat 
ships and 20 fewer support ships over the entire 30-year period. The 2009 shipbuilding 
plan estimated an acquisition of 238 combat ships and 58 logistics and support ships, 
while the 2011 shipbuilding plan estimated a purchase of 198 combat ships, 78 logistics 
and support ships over the 30-year time-period.  The Navy estimated the 30-year 
purchase of 276 ships would cost $476 billion (CY2010 dollars), which is 33% less than 
the 2009 shipbuilding plan. Using the same model, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimated the 276 ships would cost $569 billion (CY2010 dollars) (CBO Pub. No. 
4116, May 2010). Based on current and past trends in shipbuilding over 30 years, the 
DoN’s  ship buying process  will preclude it reaching its goal of 313 ships, set by the 
Chief of Naval Operations, unless Congress doubled the  Shipbuilding and Conversion, 
Navy (SCN) budget (Labs, 2010).   
The Navy and Marine Corps operate and maintain a fleet of more than 3800 fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft, including more than 1300 tactical aircraft.  There are 
possibilities of a significant drop in inventories due to high usage rates over the last 
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decade (CBO, 2010).  Most aircraft have a finite life span of approximately 8,000 flight 
hours due to fuselage and wing stress from metal fatigue.  According to CBO Pub. No. 
4113, if the Navy and Marine Corps do not adopt a strategy to either buy more F-18 
fighter aircraft and/or extend the service life of current aircraft inventories, the total 
amount of aircraft will fall to approximately 800 fighter aircraft, “and below the level 
needed for the planned force structure,” by 2020.  The Navy and Marine Corps had hoped 
the Joint Strike Fighter would be able to replace the aging fleet; however, schedule slips 
and cost overruns have dashed those hopes.  The Navy and Marine Corps will have to 
adopt a new strategy to keep their inventories and force structure at the level needed to 
complete their missions.     
These ideas explain a little about what has happened with defense force structure 
growth and reduction over the last 35 years.  Other than the aforementioned book and 
articles, no one has undertaken a significant in depth study analyzing the “what” within 
the rise and fall of defense budget authority. This study attempts to begin to fill this gap. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Research Questions 
This study attempts to answer two primary questions.  First, what insights can a 
comparative analysis of two periods of sustained budget growth and an interceding period 
of budget decline for the DoN provide?  Second, what were the changes in the DoN’s 
budget allocations, and what were their effects on force structure?  Conclusions from this 
analysis will help educate decision-makers as they budget for and manage the DoN. It is 
necessary to address a set of subordinate questions before answering the primary 
questions. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 How have DoN budget allocations for personnel and equipment changed 
during these periods? 
 How has the mix of personnel changed during these periods? 
 How have DoN budget allocations for investments and expenses 
compared during these periods? 
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 How have the inventories of ships and aircraft changed during these 
periods? 
 How have DoN budget allocations by appropriation changed during these 
periods? 
Understanding the budget trends, force structure, and appropriation allocations 
from three different periods for the DoN requires approaching the data from multiple 
directions, including: magnitude, percentage change, resource allocations, and force 
structure implications. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Because defense budgeting is one of the most complex processes, incorporating 
hundreds of variables, shape plans, and resource allocations, this study will only take into 
account the following factors: 
 This study will not attempt to measure the differences in capabilities or 
quality factors associated with people and equipment.  
 This study is only looking at DoN B/A distribution, five main 
appropriation titles, and force-structure. 
 Force structure is defined specifically as ships, aircraft, and personnel 
(Active, Reserve, and Civilian). 
 The term “Expense Accounts” refers to O&M and MILPERS. 
 The term “Investment Accounts” refers to RDT&E, Procurement, and 
MILCON. 
 This study will only analyze three particular time periods (1975–1985, 
1985–1998, and 1998–2010) 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The next six chapters will provide a brief history, background, and analysis of the 
defense and Navy’s budget authority, appropriation titles, and force structure analysis, 
which includes personnel, ships, and aircraft.  The final chapter will summarize the 




Government does not make budgetary decisions for defense in a vacuum.  The 
overall outlook for the federal budget and the deficit may dictate the future of defense 
budgets as much as DoD war-gaming, budgetary exercises, and planning scenarios 
determine military requirements for defense spending.  As long as the current 
administration and Congress remain concerned about the impact of continuing deficits on 
the economy, predictions for the growing deficit will likely constrain future defense and 
federal spending.  Therefore, how do the DoD and DoN determine how many ships, 
aircraft, submarines, and people (civilian and military) should comprise their individual 
services?   
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) interviewed several DoD officials, 
experts in defense, and the academic community. They found a “broad analytical 
framework” exists when assessing the U.S. military force structure requirements.  
GAO/NSAID-93-65 (1993) suggests that, while budgetary and political considerations 
play a role in driving the force structure proposals, there are five critical policy issues 
regarding U.S. defense and force structure:  
 The nation’s interests 
 Potential threats to those interests 
 The strategy for countering these threats, including size, nature, and 
number of contingencies that the U.S. should be prepared to engage in at 
any one time. 
 The future definition of military doctrine  
 The level of risk the nation is prepared to take regarding the inability to 
protect its vital interests. 
Another way to answer the question, “How are U.S. military forces determined?” 
is to describe the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.  
Planning is the first step in the DoD resource allocation process.  Civilians in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), along with military members in the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) do the planning with participation from the services and the needs of the 
Combatant Commanders (COCOM’s) in mind.  The President issues a National Security 
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Strategy (NSS) at the beginning of each new administration to define specific strategic 
outcomes required to meet the missions assigned to the DoD (DoD Strategic 
Management Plan, 2008).  The SECDEF then issues the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) to provide guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for the 
development of the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NDS is also the foundation 
for the development of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  The CJCS provides 
strategic direction to the military, through the NMS, consistent with the QDR and NDS. 
The Planning phase concludes when the SECDEF issues guidance to the services to help 
them build their program budgets (DAU, 2005). 
The purpose of the Programming phase is to allocate resources to support the 
roles and missions of the Military departments and other defense agencies.  During the 
Programming phase, OSD guidance and Congressional guidance are translated into 
detailed allocations of time-phased resource requirements that include forces, personnel, 
and funds.  The Programming phase will “cost out” the force objectives and personnel 
resources in financial terms for six years into the future.  This gives the SECDEF and 
President an idea of the impact that present day decisions will have on the future of the 
defense posture.  The final product of the Programming phase is an individual service’s 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which displays the resource allocation 
decisions (DAU, 2005).   
In August of every even numbered year, the services are required to submit a 
combined POM and Budget Estimate Submission (BES) to the SECDEF for the six-year 
future defense programs.  The POM/BES submissions are proposals for a balanced 
allocation of available resources.  The POM/BES also identify significant force structure 
changes, end-strength changes, major milestones in future combat systems, as well as 
program imbalances and shortfalls (DAU, 2005).  Following a thorough review of the 
POM/BES, the Program Managers (PM), comptrollers, OSD, and the Office of 
Management and Budgets (OMB) hold budget hearings with each Under Secretary of 




Once the USD comptrollers signs off on the POM, the services revise their budgets to 
incorporate the decisions from the concurrent program and budget review process (DAU, 
2005). 
There are hundreds of independent and dependent variables that determine “how 
many” aircraft, ships, and personnel the DoD needs to complete its missions in the 
uncertain future.  In addition, hundreds of independent and dependent variables 
determine “what type” of aircraft and ships the DoD needs to complete its missions in the 
future.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reorganized and changed the way the JCS 
formulated defense policy and interfaces with the resource allocation process.  Some 
major changes with regard to force structure as follows: 
 The Act designated the CJCS, not the Joint Chiefs, who held more biased 
towards their own services, as the principal military advisor to the 
President, SECDEF, and the National Security Council. 
 It also strengthened the role of the COCOM’s (e.g., PACOM) concerning 
resource allocation issues at the expense of the component commanders 
(e.g., PACFLT).  The Goldwater-Nichols Act also made the CJCS an 
inter-service representative for all issues involving the distribution of 
scarce resources.  
 It gave the CJCS additional responsibilities, including assisting the 
President and SECDEF in the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. 
This included, reviewing and preparing of contingency plans, developing 
doctrine, and advising the SECDEF on requirements, programs, and 
budgets. 
The functions of the CJCS are set forth in Title 10, United States Code, and 
detailed in DoD Directive 5100.1 (2003).  The CJCS can consult with and seek advice 
from the other member of the JCS and COCOM’s as he feels appropriate.  According to 
DoD Directive 5100.1 (2003), the CJCS shall be responsible for the following principle 
functions: 
 Advise and assist the SECDEF on the preparation of annual policy 
guidance for the Heads of the DoD Components for the preparation and 
review of program recommendations and budget proposals. 
 Prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform to resource levels 
projected by the SECDEF, to be available for the period of time for which 
the plans are to be effective. 
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 Advise the SECDEF on critical deficiencies and strengths in force 
structure and capabilities (including manpower, logistics, and mobility) 
and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on national 
security objectives and policy. 
 Advise the SECDEF as to whether or not program recommendations and 
budget proposals conform with the priorities established in the strategic 
plans and priorities established  by the COCOM’s. 
 Recommend budget proposals and force structure requirements, pursuant 
to the guidance of the SECDEF, for the activities of each COCOM, as 
appropriate. 
 Advise the SECDEF on the extent to which the major programs and 
policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform to strategic 
plans. 
 To assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs. 
 Periodically, but no less than every 2 years, review the missions, 
responsibilities, and force structure of each COCOM and recommend to 
the President, through SECDEF, any changes to missions, responsibilities, 
and force structure, as may be necessary. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the DoD Directive 5100.1 added several 
responsibilities to the CJCS. Therefore, they created the J-8 Force Structure, Resources, 
and Assessment Directorate to support the CJCS on resource allocation issues and force 
structure analysis.  The J-8 is responsible for providing support to the CJCS by evaluating 
and developing force structure requirements and assessing the sufficiency of joint forces 
to execute the defense strategy.  This enables the CJCS to make informed 
recommendations to the SECDEF.  The J-8 Directorate also provides the CJCS with the 
necessary means to respond to COCOM’s requirements and influence the resources 
allocated within the DoD.  The J-8 staff analyzes individual service programs and 
provides specific alternatives to OSD. More importantly, the CJCS has the ability to 
recommend budget alternatives to the services’ budget submissions. 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET 
Two measures typically used to discuss the national defense budget are budget 
authority (B/A) and outlays. Federal law (generally appropriations) provides budget 
authority that allows government officials to enter into financial obligations that will 
result in immediate or future outlays involving federal government funds.  
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An outlay is an issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of 
funds made to liquidate a federal obligation. Outlays also occurs when interest on the 
Treasury debt, held by the public, accrues and when the government issues bonds, notes, 
debentures, monetary credits, or other cash-equivalent instruments in order to liquidate 
obligations (Comptroller, 2010). 
DoD and DoN B/A indicate the relative importance of defense spending in terms 
of spending for all the other activities of the federal government. There are two main 
categories of federal spending, mandatory and discretionary.  The DoD’s and DoN’s B/A 
are derived from the discretionary spending account.  As a percentage of total federal 
spending, the DoD comprises approximately 19% and as a percentage of discretionary 
spending, the DoD comprises approximately 50%.  A decrease in the percentage of B/A 
for defense indicates a movement in governmental priorities away from defense and 
toward other functions.  
Since 1975, the DoD’s and DoN’s budget authority have sustained two periods of 
growth, between 1975–1985 and 1998–2010, and a period of interceding decline from 
1985 to 1998, as depicted in Figure 1 and Table 1. 
 
$371 $564 $564 $383 $383 $663
$120 $194 $194 $119 $119 $169
Department of Defense
Department of the Navy
1975-1985 1985-1998 1998-2010
DoD and DoN Total B/A in CY2010 (in billions)
 
Table 1.   DoD and DoN Total Budget Authority (From Comptroller, 2010) 
According to Jones and Bixler (1992), growth or decline of the DoD budget may 
be the result of congressional control. Analysts can use a comparison of post 1974 DoD 
budget growth and decline with Congressional Directives issued during the same period 
to assess the relationship between these variables using budget as a measure of outlays. 
Using a similar concept, this project will measure the relationship between the DoN’s 
budget, as a measure of B/A, and its force structure using specific variables such as 
appropriations, personnel, ships and aircraft.  It will then analyze factors influencing the 
DoN’s budget authority to assess the growth and decline periods.   
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Several factors affect budget authority and outlays. According to Brook and 
Candreva (2007), investigations of the defense budget over time must compare the 
following factors that affect B/A and outlays: 
 Deficits 
 Mandatory & Discretionary Spending/Programs 
 Public Opinion  
 Appropriations 
 Supplemental Appropriations  
Many factors affect the budget authority of both the Department of Defense 
Budget and other departmental budgets, some of which have been touched on already.  
The following pages will dive further into these definitions and examine how they apply 
to both the DoD, and, more specifically, the Navy budgeting process. 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the primary indicators used to 
gauge the size of a country's economy. It represents the total dollar value of all goods and 
services produced over a specific period.  The expenditure method is a common 
approach, calculated by adding total consumption, investment, government spending and 
net exports.  GDP is an indicator of economic output and growth.  Real GDP considers 
inflation, allowing for comparisons against other historical periods to help analyze. 
Analysts can measure budget authority as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (% GDP). The % GDP spent on defense is useful when comparing the defense 
spending of different countries, as it normalizes the level of spending in terms relative to 
the size of the nations’ economies. They can also measure it as a percentage of total 
federal outlays. The second relative measure is important to determine the importance of 
defense spending relative to other federal programs, and the next section will address 
this. 
B. UNDERSTANDING NAVY’S BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS 
An appropriations act provides budget authority. Congress specifies the 
purpose(s) for which each particular appropriation may be used, as well as the amount of 
budget authority provided under each appropriation. The DoN’s budget authority is 
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comprised of the following five major appropriations: Military Personnel, Operation and 
Maintenance, Procurement, Research Development, Test, and Evaluation, and Military 
Construction.  There are a few other accounts, but for the purpose of this paper, they are 
statistically irrelevant due to the small percentage of budget authority they encompass. 
Military Personnel appropriations fund salaries and other compensation for active 
and retired military personnel and reserve forces. MILPERS budget activities include Pay 
and Allowances of Officers, Pay and Allowances of Enlisted, Pay and Allowances of 
Midshipmen, Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel, Permanent Change of Station travel, and 
Other Military Personnel Costs.  
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations fund expenses such as civilian 
salaries, travel, minor construction projects, operating military forces, training and 
education, depot maintenance, stock funds, and base operations support. O&M budget 
activities include Operating Forces, Mobilization, Training and Recruiting, and 
Administration and Service Wide Support. 
Procurement appropriations fund those acquisition programs that have been 
approved for production (to include Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of acquisition 
objective quantities), and all costs integral and necessary to deliver a useful end item 
intended for operational use or inventory upon delivery. Aircraft Procurement budget 
activities include Combat Aircraft, Airlift Aircraft, Trainer Aircraft, Other Aircraft, 
Modification of Aircraft, Aircraft Spares and Repair parts, and Aircraft Support 
Equipment and Facilities. Other Procurement Navy (OPN) budget activities include Ships 
Support Equipment, Communications and Electronics Equipment, Aviation Support 
Equipment, Personnel and Command Support Equipment and Spares and Repair Parts. 
Investments made with OPN funds finance the procurement, production, and 
modernization of equipment not otherwise provided for. 
Another aspect or division of Procurement would be the Shipbuilding and 




acquiring ships and maintaining them.  The formulation of the SCN budget and its 
relationship to the Shipbuilding Cost Adjustment (SCA) review can be traced through to 
the President's budget and Congress. 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations fund the 
investment efforts performed by contractors and government activities required for the 
Research and Development (R&D) of equipment, material, computer application 
software, and its Test and Evaluation (T&E), including Initial Operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOT&E) and Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E). RDT&E also funds the 
operation of dedicated R&D installation activities for the conduct of R&D programs. 
RDT&E budget activities include Basic Research, Applied Research, Advances 
Technology Development, Demonstration and Validation, Systems Development and 
Demonstration, and Operational Systems Development. 
Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations fund major projects such as 
bases, schools, missile storage facilities, maintenance facilities, medical/dental clinics, 
libraries, and military family housing. MILCON budget activities include Major 
construction, Minor Construction, Planning, Supporting, and Operational Systems 
Development. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of these appropriations in actual dollar values of 

























DoN Budget Authority by Appropriation (1975-2010)
MILPERS O & M PROCUREMENT RDT&E MILCON
 
Figure 2.  DoN B/A by Appropriation (From Comptroller, 2010) 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of these appropriations as a percent of total DoD 
budget authority. One can see that operating accounts, such as O&M have generally 
grown in share, while military personnel accounts have decreased. Procurement accounts 


























Precentage of DoD B/A by Appropriation Title 1975-2010
MILPERS  O&M  PROCUREMENT  RDT&E  MILCON 
 
Figure 3.  DoD Appropriation Distribution (From Comptroller, 2010) 
Budget authority, for the purposes of this study, falls into two different categories. 
Expense accounts encompass MILPERS and O&M appropriations, and Investment 
accounts encompass of RDT&E, Procurement, and MILCON. 
C. UNDERSTANDING FORCE STRUCTURE 
The structure, design, organization, and disposition of U.S. military forces have 
changed significantly. America's military has evolved. What exists now differs in some 
important respects from what existed at the end of the Cold War in 1989, largely because 
of downsizing the Cold War force structure.  New and more powerful precision 
equipment has replaced older instruments of war, and new kinds of tools have entered the 
inventories.  
The military needs the ability to achieve specific wartime and national security 
objectives.  Moore et al. (1991) found that the military organization includes four major 
components or “pillars:” force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.  
Force structure includes numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise U.S. 
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defense forces (e.g., divisions, ships, air wings).  This study focuses on both manpower 
and force structure, and it examines how these two key segments of the Department of 
the Navy’s budget have fluctuated inconsistently in relation to the budget authority. 
Historically, as the budget rises and falls, so does the force structure.  Currently 
the US is experiencing a period of increased budgets and spending, yet its numbers of 
people, ships, submarines, and aircraft continue to fall.  Large organizations such as the 
DoD and DoN have requirements and acquisitions processes to recruit and buy people, 
things, and equipment.  The Defense Acquisition System is the management process by 
which the DoD provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to military and civilian 
users, and it is governed by the following policies:  Flexibility, Responsiveness, 
Innovation, Discipline, and Streamlined and Effective Management (DoD, 2007).  
Accordingly, under Title 10, U.S. Code, the DoD services are required by law to 
“organize, train, and equip” their respective forces.  For a requirement or acquisition 
process to turn into a tangible or intangible product, there has to be an operator or need 
for some capability.  For a military service staff officer, those requirements and 
acquisitions processes interweave and become an “operational requirement” from the 
operator in a field level unit or on a ship.  The operational requirement is the process by 
which operators select and propose new weapons systems, people, and equipment to their 
respective headquarters.  Once the service headquarters and the Pentagon approve a true 
“requirement,” they must factor it into their long and medium range plans.  The need for 
a particular capability then shifts to the PPBE process, which functions to finance, 











A. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The comparison of two periods of sustained budget growth and an interceding 
period of budget decline for the Department of the Navy, looking specifically at budget 
allocations and changes in force structure, consisted of three steps.  The first step 
collected actual budget authority and force structure data from a reliable source. The 
second step organized the data into a useful presentation format.  The last step described 
and analyzed the data presented.  The last step ultimately describes and compares the 
trend of defense budgeting and force structure during two periods of sustained growth 
(1975–1985 and 1998–2010) and the interceding period of decline (1985–1998).  The 
scope of this research project is limited to the Department of the Navy's budget authority 
and force structure; however, this research project will point out major deviations from 
broader DoD trends, when applicable. 
1. Source of Data 
The National Defense Budget Estimates, commonly referred to as “The Green 
Book,” is a convenient reference source for data about the current budget estimates of the 
Department of Defense. It also provides current and constant dollar historical data for the 
department, as well as selected data on national defense, the total federal budget, and the 
U.S. economy. The edition used reflects the FY 2010 President’s Budget as submitted to 
Congress in May 2009 (Comptroller, 2010).   
Force structure data came from multiple sources to keep all information constant 
and credible across all three-time periods.  The Department of the Navy, Budget 
Highlights books, and the Naval Historical Center were sources of force structure data 
that included number of ships, aircraft, and active duty personnel. 
All personnel data came from the 2010 National Defense Budget Estimates 
publication, and a comparison against the yearly individual President’s Federal Budget 
submissions verified it.  This data included all active duty and reserve military personnel, 
as well as all DoD and DoN civilian employees. 
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The number of ships active each year from 1975–2009 were gathered from the 
U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels developed by the Naval Historical Center.  There 
was a gap in the data for years 2008 and 2010, so the team used the Department of the 
Navy, Budget Highlights books to extract the number of ships for those two years. 
Department of the Navy aircraft data came from two different sources.  Limiting 
the data origination to two sources enabled the maintenance of continuity.  The first 
source, located on the Naval Historical Center’s website in appendix 4 of the United 
States Naval Aviation 1910–1995 publication, which is located in the Library of 
Congress database, covered the period 1975–1993.  The second source, found in the 
Aircraft Inventory Readiness and Reporting System (AIRRS) maintained in the Naval 
Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) Integrated Data Environment, covered the 
period of 1994–2010.  Using two separate sources for aircraft created some difficulty 
with matching the recording style for the break out of the aircraft into type.  Appendix 4 
from the Naval Historical Center does not state the method used to designate each aircraft 
into the categories of combat, transport/utility, observation, rotary wing, or other.  In 
addition, the AIRRS report states the type, model, and series (T/M/S) of each aircraft, but 
does not designate them as any of the aforementioned categories.  To maintain continuity 
between source documents, the team used its experience and best judgment, along with 
research about each aircraft, to categorize all T/M/S aircraft from 1994–2010.  
2. Organization of Data 
The data were organized into three periods: 1975–1985, 1985–1998, and 1998–
2010 that represent the peaks and trough of the DoD and DoN B/A over the past 35 years. 
To maintain consistency of analysis the team converted all dollars to current year (2010 
dollars) using the current year’s deflator and the joint inflation from the website for the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis.  For the purposes of this study, the DoD and DoN B/A 
used the Total Defense deflator from table 10.1 out of the historical tables on the website 
for the OMB, while all other factors were converted to constant 2010 dollars using the 
Total Non-Defense deflators.  
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By looking at dollar amounts across various years, in the constant-dollar format, 
one will see “real growth,” or real program change. The data will show how much a 
product or service increased or decreased in price—without the impact of inflation.  With 
an understanding of current dollars and constant dollars, variations in purchasing power 
are evident. If one million dollars bought three aircraft in 1907, but only one aircraft in 
2008, purchasing power has declined. The consumer now gets less “bang for the buck.” 
Inflation is usually a dominant factor in the decline of purchasing power. 
The organization of the data will allow for relatively easy sorting and 
manipulation.  The data will be organized and sorted in a Microsoft Excel workbook. An 
Excel spreadsheet serves to organize and sort the data from all of the Navy Budget 
actions and appropriations. The team collected the following data from each 
appropriation: MILPERS, MILCON, RDT&E, Procurement, and RDT&E. 
3. Presentation of Data 
Next, the team developed a consistent method to present the data in a meaningful 
format.  The presentation of the data consists of four parts: Formulation of relevant 
questions, presentation of data in a graph or table, description of data found in each graph 
or table, and analysis of data.  Following this rubric ensured the consistent presentation of 
information.  
 Formulation of relevant questions—This step provided relevant questions 
used to describe and answer the primary research question. These 
questions provided a deeper insight to conduct a comparative analysis of 
the last two periods of sustained budget growth and its interceding period 
of decline for the Department of the Navy, and to describe corresponding 
changes in DoN  B/A and force structure. 
 Presentation of Data—Graphs and tables are the most efficient way to 
present the data gathered from the research. They provide a visual 
representation of the data used to answer the primary and secondary 
research questions. 
 Description of Data—This section further explains the information in the 
tables and figures and identifies highlights and trends within the 
information. This focuses the reader’s attention on the applicable results 
determined from the data collected. 
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 Analysis of Data—This section provides plausible explanations and 
analysis for the data found. It also answers the questions provided for each 
section.  
The presentation of data’s primary focus will consist of rates of change for the 
Department of Navy’s budget authority and force structure to include personnel, ships 
and aircraft.   That is, the team measured the change in the DoN’s budget authority by the 
change in its distribution across each appropriation and analyzed each appropriation by 
the rate of change between each period in inflation-adjusted dollars. 
Force structure underwent the same analysis. The force structure, in this case, is 
composed of the number of personnel, ships, and aircraft. The team compared the rate of 
change for both force structure and each appropriation between each period. These tests 
will present the best measurements to provide a comparative analysis of the last two 
periods of sustained budget growth and the interceding period of decline for the 
Department of the Navy with a focus on the corresponding changes in DoN  B/A and 
force structure. 
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IV. BUDGET AUTHORITY AND APPROPRIATIONS 
To understand the nature of the DoN budgeting, one must analyze changes in its 
budget authority and the process of allocation. This section will provide a deeper insight 
into the priorities and interests of the DoN, as well as its plans for the future. The 
Department of Defense, as whole, has had a significant increase in budget authority over 
the past 12 years, similar to the growth between 1975 and 1985. Since the end of the 
Vietnam War in 1975, the DoN’s involvement in U.S. military operations has changed 
and has influenced the use of its budget authority during periods of growth and decline. 
Both periods of budget growth occurred in either an environment of escalation of 
hostilities between the United States and world powers or terrorist actions.  The first 
period, 1975 to 1985, revolved around the growth of naval power to counter the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War.  The second growth period followed an increased 
commitment to combat terrorist threats with focused efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
This resulted in a shift from building up naval forces to developing a more robust ground 
force, which also affected DoN budget authority.  Budgets are very cyclical in nature, and 
when there is a growth period, a period of decline usually follows.  
There are many ways to analyze funding within the Department of Navy.  One 
option is to look at the total budget authority afforded to the DoN and determine if 
anomalies exist when comparing the two periods of growth and their relationship to the 
total budget authority for the DoD. This study also separates budget authority into its 
appropriation categories to more precisely examine its different aspects and determine 
reasons for any anomalies in the expected trends. The following chapter will discuss 
some of the comparison factors in the relationship between the DoD and DoN budget 
authority and appropriation accounts. 
A. ANALYSIS OF DoD AND DoN BUDGET AUTHORITY 
Defense budgets run in cycles, with periods of increase followed by periods of 
decline. For years, many have thought the defense budget would be coming down, but 
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both the DoD and DoN total budget authority have been growing since 1998. The FY 
2010 Department of Navy B/A was 42% higher than in FY 1998 in constant dollars. The 
DoD had a growth of 73% during the same period. 
The concern is not necessarily the money or the total funding of the B/A, but 
rather where the money is going.  Although the DoN had growth in its budget authority 
during both periods, 1975–1985 and 1998–2010, there is a significant difference in the 
makeup of the force structure.  This is also true for the DoD.  Are there are any 
comparisons to be made between the real change in DoD and DoN B/A?  Looking into 
the top line B/A for each department will provide some background for further study. 
Figure 4 shows the annual trends in the DoD and DoN budgets since 1975 in 
dollar amounts.  Table 2 shows the real change in the total B/A within both the 





























































DoD & DoN Total B/A 
DoD Total B/A (CY2010 $) (LHS) DoN Total B/A (CY2010 $) (RHS)
 




1975 - 1985 1985 - 1998 1998 - 2010
DOD Total B/A (2010 dollars) 52% -32% 73%
DON Total B/A (2010 dollars) 62% -39% 42%
Total Budget Authority
 
Table 2.   Real Change in Total Budget Authority (From Comptroller, 2010) 
DoD and DoN follow very similar trends throughout the period of 1975–2010.  
There is some divergence in the data during the third period.  Table 2 shows that in the 
DoD, there was a 73% increase in B/A, while the DoN only rose 42% during the same 
period.  There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, the DoD 
comprises all of the armed forces.  Different percentages of funding allocations occur for 
any number of reasons.  In addition, current world events are major factors on the 
makeup of the military.  During the first and second periods, 1975–1985 and 1985–1998, 
the government in place was dealing with the buildup of the Navy in order to bolster the 
show of force during the Cold War. The ensuing draw down drew the DoD’s attention to 
the high cost of the Navy.  This explains the close relationship between the DoD and 
DoN during the two periods.  The third period is different in the way the relationship 
changes for both departments.  The missions that the military deals with are ever 
changing, and current conditions around the world dictate that the DoD focus more on 
building and maintaining ground forces than continue building a Navy that already has 
superiority on the seas.  This would explain the divergence in the data starting in 2002.  
The DoD’s budget increased rapidly.  The Navy’s B/A did not.  As the DoD developed a 
greater ground forces presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army grew very quickly in 
both labor and technology, therefore, it required more funding.  Since the Army is a very 
large department, when its B/A increases, the DoD B/A rate of change can be affected. 
B. DoN BUDGET AUTHORITY BY APPROPRIATION TITLE  
One way to measure how the DoN allocates its budget authority is to analyze the 
changes in each appropriation title. Over time, the changes in distribution of B/A among 
the different appropriations provide insight into where the DoN’s priorities may lie, and 
how they may shape the future of the Navy and its force structure. Do the amounts of 
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B/A allocated for each appropriation remain consistent with Total DoN B/A movement? 
Does the distribution of DoN B/A remain constant during periods of growth? In this 
section, that analysis begins with a look into the change in distribution of DoN B/A by 
appropriation title and the relationship between DoN B/A and each appropriation title 
B/A over the periods under study. 
1. Analysis of DoN B/A by Appropriation Title  
Figure 5 displays the change in DoN B/A by appropriation title in CY $2010 over 
all three periods. Tables 3 and 4 display the real growth in DoN B/A by appropriation 














































DoN Budget Authority by Appropriation Title
DON B/A (RHS) MILPERS (LHS) O & M (LHS)
PROCUREMENT (LHS) RDT&E (LHS) MILCON (LHS)
 




1975 1985 1998 2010
MILPERS 37,200 51,063 38,459 46,172
O&M 39,653 57,080 38,376 50,885
PROCUREMENT 31,526 57,826 23,744 45,359
RDT&E 10,650 15,781 9,645 19,770
MILCON 2,525 2,795 2,168 4,353
DoN B/A by Appropriation Title
 




MILPERS 37.3% 13,863 MILPERS ‐24.7% ‐12,603 MILPERS 20.1% 7,713
O&M 43.9% 17,427 O&M ‐32.8% ‐18,704 O&M 32.6% 12,509
PROCUREMENT 83.4% 26,300 PROCUREMENT ‐58.9% ‐34,082 PROCUREMENT 91.0% 21,616
RDT&E 48.2% 5,130 RDT&E ‐38.9% ‐6,136 RDT&E 105.0% 10,125
MILCON 10.7% 270 MILCON ‐22.4% ‐626 MILCON 100.7% 2,184




Table 4.   Real Growth DoN B/A by Appropriation Title (From Comptroller, 2010) 
What is immediately apparent is how each appropriation follows consistently with 
total DoN B/A across all three periods.  Figure 6 and Table 5 show that each 
appropriation rose during the first period of budget growth. Procurement had the greatest 
growth of all the appropriations and increased from $31 billion to $57 billion to post an 
83.4% growth. During the intervening period of decline, each appropriation decreased 
and remained consistent with the DoN’s top line. Again, the greatest change occurred 
within the Procurement appropriation with a negative 58.9% growth. Procurement budget 
authority fell from $57 billion to $23 billion during this time. The second period of 
budget growth (1998–2010), however, differs from the first (1975–1985), even though 
during both periods there is an increase in DoN B/A. In this period, the appropriations 
with the largest growth were RDT&E and MILCON. Both doubled, and Procurement was 
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not far behind with a 91% real growth. RDT&E increased from $9 billion to $19 billion; 
MILCON increased from $2 billion to $4 billion; and Procurement increased from $23 
billion to $45 billion.  
The growth of the MILPERS and O&M appropriation was 17% and 9% lower 
respectively during the second period of growth. This indicates that the Navy was 
allocating funds away from expense accounts (i.e., MILPERS and O&M) toward 
investment accounts (i.e., RDT&E, MILCON, and Procurement).  With the larger 
increases in RDT&E, MILCON, and Procurement during this current period of budget 
growth, one can conclude that the Navy was investing in its future. 
2. Analysis of DoN B/A Distribution by Appropriation Title 
Table 3 displays the actual dollar amount of DoN B/A distributed across all 
appropriations.  Figure 6 displays the change in distribution of DoN B/A by appropriation 
title from 1975–2010.  Table 5 depicts the real percentage growth during each period for 










































DoN B/A Distribution by Appropriation Title
DON B/A (RHS) MILPERS (LHS) O&M (LHS)
PROCUREMENT (LHS) RDT&E (LHS) MILCON (LHS)
 




MILPERS 25.1% 31.9% 29.1%
O & M 30.2% 30.1% 31.8%
PROCUREMENT 29.1% 23.4% 23.1%
RDT&E 7.7% 8.1% 10.6%
MILCON 1.4% 1.4% 1.5%
Average Percentage of DoN B/A 
 
Table 5.   Average Percentage of DoN B/A (From Comptroller, 2010) 
Immediately noticeable is the inconsistent distribution of budget authority across 
all three periods. If it were consistent, one would expect to see an equal distribution 
between all appropriations. To help understand the trends among the appropriation 
accounts, they will be groups into expense versus investment accounts.  During the first 
period (1975–1985) the figure shows that MILPERS and O&M (expense accounts) make 
up 55.3% and Procurement, RDT&E, and MILCON (investment accounts) make up 
38.2% of total DoN B/A. That illustrates an expense vs. investment ratio of 1.48.  During 
the second period (1985–1998), the expense accounts, MILPERS and O&M, make up 
62% and the investment accounts, Procurement, RDT&E, and MILCON, make up 
32.9%, which illustrated an expense vs. investment ratio of 1.88.  During the third period 
(1998–2010), the expense accounts make up 60.9% and the investment accounts make up 
35.2% of the appropriation funding.  The ratio of expense vs. investment for the third 
period comes in at 1.73.  Looking at all three periods, the ratio for the recent growth 
period is closer to the period of decline than to the last period of growth. 
To better understand how the Navy proportions its B/A, one needs to follow 
where it is allocating its funds. During the first period the Navy allocated most of its 
funds to O&M and Procurement, which is reasonable considering the nation was 
recovering from the war with North Vietnam. This distribution indicates that the navy 
wanted to build its force structure and focused less on compensating its service members. 
The second period was a relative time of peace for the Navy, despite the Persian Gulf 
War in 1990–1991.  The distribution changes during this period and indicates the Navy is 
devoting more of its funds to its expense accounts, with MILPERS and O&M making up 
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64% of DoN B/A. Relatively, the Navy spent more on its investment accounts during the 
first period than the second period. The third period indicates that the Navy’s proportions 
are similar to what they were during the first period of growth. With the United States at 
war since 2001, the Navy has seen increase in Procurement B/A, and O&M still has the 
largest distribution of DoN B/A. MILPERS also shows a decrease similar to that of the 
first time period. During times of growth, the DoN seems to favor investments over 





Personnel costs are often one of the main drivers of budgets in the public sector. 
Given the closed personnel system of the military (all senior uniformed personnel are 
promoted from within), the tools for shaping the force are limited, budget actions have 
long-term consequences, and desired changes in force structure take a long time to 
implement. Over the past few decades, the military has used technology to replace or 
enhance the capabilities of uniformed personnel. Management reforms and budget 
considerations motivated the department to replace certain military personnel with 
civilians and certain government employees (uniformed or civilian) with contractors. All 
of these factors have budgetary and force structure implications. This chapter examines 
the Navy’s budgets during the three periods with a focus on personnel. The first section 
presents data on the structure of military and civilian personnel. The second section 
examines the allocation of MILPERS and O&M spending for those personnel. The last 
section examines overall DoN spending on a per capita basis. In doing this, the team 
looked for trends within and across the three periods and evidence of these factors. 
A. STRUCTURE OF DoN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
One method to measure the size of a military is to count the number of men and 
women in uniform. One might also consider the government civilian employees that 
support the uniformed force. In addition, one may consider the mix within the military 
(officers and enlisted, sailors and marines) and civilian (white-collar, blue-collar) force. 
Over time, one would expect the proportions to vary in response to environmental and 
managerial actions, as well as the overall size of the DoN budget. Do all categories move 
as the top line budgets move or is there evidence of “brass creep”—the charge that over 
time there are proportionally more senior officials than junior personnel? Is there 
evidence of civilian substitution of military personnel? Is there evidence of outsourcing? 
Moreover, have such factors influenced the structure of the force consistently in each of 
the three periods under study?  In this section, that analysis begins with an analysis of the 
DoN Personnel structure. 
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1. Analysis of DoN Officer and Enlisted Force Structure 
Figure 7 depicts the overall number of DoN Officers and enlisted personnel, from 
1975 to 2010, distinguishing between Navy and Marine Corps.  Table 6 is a breakdown 
of the actual number of personnel and real percentage changes that have been gained or 
































































Total Deparment of the Navy & Marine Corps Officers and Enlisted
(Source: Federal Budget)
Navy Enlisted (LHS) Marine Enlisted (LHS) Navy Officers (RHS) Marine Officers (RHS)
 
Figure 7.  Total DoN Officer and Enlisted Personnel (From Federal Budget 1975–
2010) 
What is immediately apparent is that the number of personnel in the DoN does not 
vary consistently with the top line budget for the Navy. If it did, one would expect to see 
the line trend upward on the two sides and trend downward in the middle. Clearly, that is 
not the pattern.  Notice that the point of inflection on this graph happens in the middle of 
the period of decline, denoting that the fall in personnel lagged behind the decline in 
TOA, but was consistent with the MILPERS account.  The chart and Table 6 show that 
all categories of uniformed personnel rose during the first period of budget growth, but 
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during the second period of growth, the Marine Corps increased in size while the Navy 
became smaller. During the intervening period of decline, all categories of military 
personnel shrank. The Marine Corps recovered from the decline of the middle period. It 
is now larger than at any time during this 35-year period.  On the other hand, the size of 
the Navy peaked in 1991 and steadily decreased in size through the third period, despite 
an increasing budget. In the first period, about 73% of the uniformed personnel in the 
DoN wore Navy uniforms. That percentage peaked in 1992 at 74.2% and has fallen 
steadily since to about 62% today. 
In addition, the shifts have not been proportional among officers and enlisted 
personnel. In general the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel has risen. Table 6 shows 
that in the first period, growth in the officer corps outpaced enlisted growth, in the second 
period the decline in the officer corps was less than that of enlisted, and in the third 
period, the trend continued.  One can see that of the two services, the size of the Marine 
Corps has been stable relative to the size of the Navy. One can also see that the ratio of 
officers to enlisted personnel in the Navy has shifted more than it has in the Marine 
Corps.  In 1975, 11.5% of the DoN uniformed personnel were officers, in 1985 that 
climbed to 12%. By 1998, it was 13.2%, and today is 14.1%. There is some evidence of 
“brass creep,” but the phenomenon is primarily limited to the Navy.  The Navy’s ratio 
went from 11.5% to 18.2%, whereas the Marine Corps’ ratio rose comparatively less, 
from 9.5% to 10.7%.  DoD-wide, the ratio shifted from 13.9% to 16.4% over these 35 
years. 
 
Marine Officer 12.2% Marine Officer -12.4% Marine Officer 18.2%
Marine Enlisted 1.5% Marine Enlisted -13.0% Marine Enlisted 17.2%
Navy Officer 5.8% Navy Officer -20.3% Navy Officer -5.1%
Navy Enlisted 3.2% Navy Enlisted -33.0% Navy Enlisted -17.3%
DOD Officers 3.0% DOD Officers -25.6% DOD Officers 1.9%
DOD Enlisted -0.5% DOD Enlisted -35.3% DOD Enlisted -0.2%
1975 - 1985 1985 - 1998 1998 - 2010Increase/Decrease All Decreased by Increase/Decrease



















Table 6.   DoD and DoN Officers and Enlisted Gains and Losses (From Federal Budget 
1975–2010) 
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2. Analysis of DoN Civilian Structure 
Does the size of the civilian workforce supporting the DoN follow a similar 
pattern?  Figure 8 reveals a civilian workforce profile that is consistent with the 
uniformed Navy (officers and enlisted added together) profile, but inconsistent with the 
USMC uniformed profile.  Of all the personnel in the DoN, civilians comprised 44.6% in 
1975. Their numbers grew modestly to 45.9% in 1985 fell to 37.8% in 1998 during the 
middle period of budget decline, and there has been no change during the recent period of 
budget growth. The ratio in 2010 is also 37.8%, although it dipped to 35% in 2002.  
Therefore, the civilian portion of the department’s personnel grew proportional to the 
overall growth of uniformed personnel during the periods of growth, but fell more 
dramatically than the uniformed portion during the period of decline. Curiously, the 
percentage of the workforce manned by civilians is relatively unchanged in the last 
period, despite a concerted effort to substitute civilian personnel for uniformed personnel. 
It is possible that a simultaneous effort to outsource masks the civilian substitution effect. 
The following sections will further explore the evidence for outsourcing.  
 
Figure 8.  Uniformed and Civilian Personnel in DoN (From Comptroller, 2010) 
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Unfortunately, the team only had aggregate DoN civilian personnel data with no 
division between those who support the Navy and those who support the Marine Corps.  
Therefore, one cannot determine whether the ratio of uniformed to civilian personnel 
changed for each service. 
One thing that is noticeable, as stated earlier, is the trend in personnel.  All three 
divisions of personnel peaked at the same time in the mid to late 1980s.  There is a 
definite lag between the declines in total Budget Authority, but it does tend to follow with 
the declines in MILPERS appropriations. 
Just as there was an increase in the proportion of officers in the uniformed force, 
there has been an increase in the proportion of white-collar type jobs in the civilian 
workforce.  Figure 9 displays DoD-wide data of the civilian workforce payroll by 
category of civilian employee.  DoN-only data were unavailable, but it is believed that 
the distribution of civilians across the military departments is similar. One can see a 
steady rise in the payroll for General Schedule employees (at least since 1981) who 
normally do managerial and administrative tasks similar to those performed by the officer 
corps or senior non-commissioned officers. In contrast, there is a steady decline in the 
payroll for Wage Board employees, who generally are skilled or unskilled people who 
perform the “blue collar” typically done by enlisted personnel in the services. The 
greatest divergence occurred during the period of budget decline, when there was a 25% 
increase in GS payroll, while there was a 50% decrease in the WB payroll. It would be 
overly simplistic, and data is not available to support the conclusion, but there is 
anecdotal evidence that WB workers were more prone to outsourcing, and the GS 
workers were more likely serving as substitutes for military personnel.  In addition, as 
wage board employees become more educated or skilled, they moved into the 




Figure 9.  DoD Civilian Pay (1975–2010) (From Comptroller, 2010) 
To better understand budget trends during these three periods, the next section 
analyzes the demographic data in light of the appropriations that pay for personnel. 
B. ALLOCATION OF MILPERS AND O&M SPENDING FOR PERSONNEL 
Another way to measure trends in uniform and civilian personnel is to gauge how 
much budget authority is allocated to the relevant appropriation accounts.  Uniform 
military personnel pay and benefits come from the Military Personnel appropriation 
(MILPERS), whereas civilian pay and benefits come from the Operation and 
Maintenance appropriation (O&M).  When looking at the data, it is important to delineate 
that the relationship between MILPERS and military personnel is different from the one 
between O&M and civilians.  There is a close connection between uniformed military 
personnel and MILPERS, since funding those personnel is the main purpose of the 
account.  O&M, on the other hand, handles much more than just the payment of civilians.  
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 Throughout the three periods, one would expect the amount of these accounts to 
vary in response to number of personnel in each category and the overall fluctuation of 
the DoN budget.  Is there a relationship between the number of personnel, either active 
duty or civilian, and their respective appropriation accounts?  Does the level of funding 
for MILPERS and O&M match existing trends in DoN total B/A?  In this section, that 
analysis begins with an analysis of the DoN appropriations for personnel. 
1. Analysis of MILPERS and O&M 
Figure 10 visually expresses the number of DoN Personnel, both military and 
civilian, from 1975 to 2010.  The bar graph represents the number of personnel per year 
for each sector, and the line graph represents the funding allocated to each appropriation 
































































DoN Personnel vs. MILPERS / O&M Approriations
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The first thing that comes to mind when reviewing this chart is that the 
appropriation accounts do not follow the same trends as the personnel data in all three 
periods.  Throughout the first two periods, military and civilian personnel and both of the 
appropriation accounts have similar movement, which coincides with the top line DoN 
budget authority.  The pattern changes in the third period when appropriations increase 
without a corresponding increase in the number of personnel. 
Table 7 describes the real change to each of the appropriation accounts, personnel 
data, and dollar per person for each period.  The table shows that MILPERS has an 
increase of 20.1% in period three, and the DoN Military personnel drop by 5.2%. 
Therefore, one sees an increase of 26.7% in MILPERS dollars per uniform personnel.  
Table 7 also illustrates that O&M funding increased by 32.6%, while the DoN Civilian 
population decreased by 5.2%. As expected, there was an increase of 39.9% in O&M per 
civilian.  One would expect that if the funding for MILPERS is growing, then the 
numbers of military personnel would also be going up, but this is not the case.  This is the 
most difficult concept to understand.  The MILPERS account has only a few divisions 
and military personnel pay is by far the largest.  A possible explanation is that personnel 
are being paid better today than in the past.  A decrease in the number of people, coupled 
with an increase in pay could explain these two opposite trend directions.  The increase in 
MILPERS dollars per person confirms this idea.  In other words, the increase in pay may 
relate to retention and the fight against the pay gap between military and civilian careers. 
A CBO study also reported that the key statistic widely cited to represent the military 
“pay gap” and used to justify the large military pay increases “does not accurately 
measure what it purports to.”  CBO concluded that relying on this statistic to set pay 
raises “is inappropriate” (CBO, 1999).  Although the report states that this might not be 
the correct measurement for pay increases, it is what Congress and other policy makers 





MILPER 37.3% -24.7% 20.1%
DON Military 5.2% -27.8% -5.2%
MILPER per Person 30.5% 4.4% 26.7%
O & M 43.9% -32.8% 32.6%
DON Civilian 8.3% -40.5% -5.2%
O&M per Person 40.6% 13.0% 39.9%
Personnel and Appropriation Real Change
 
Table 7.   Personnel and Appropriation Real Change (From Comptroller, 2010) 
When looking at the O&M appropriations alongside the DoN civilian data similar 
trends are evident.  Throughout the first two periods, the civilians and the appropriation 
account mirror each other.  During the period of growth, 1975–1985, there is an increase 
in O&M of 43.9%, and DoN civilians also increased by 8.3%, which is expected.  When 
looking at the second period of growth, 1998–2010, there is an opposite reaction.  The 
O&M appropriation, in the third period, continued to have growth of 32.6%, yet the 
civilian population fell by 5.2%.  When looking at the O&M per person, there was an 
even larger increase than the aforementioned MILPERS per person.  The O&M account 
had a 12.5% greater increase in funding, yet maintained the same decrease in personnel 
as the military.  Although it looks as if civilian personnel are receiving more money per 
person than are military personnel, there is a reason why this would occur. 
The O&M appropriation account is comprised of many different categories, and 
civilian pay is just one of those categories.  This account pays for most of the current 
operations funding, therefore the current state of our military operation schedules could 
easily explain the large increase in funding accompanied by a drop in civilian personnel. 
C. DoN SPENDING PER CAPITA 
Another way to measure the size and health of the DoN is to look at spending in 
various categories per uniformed member or per civilian. Per capita is typically for a 
measure of a nation’s wealth.  For the purposes of this thesis, the application of per capita 
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will occur by dividing amount of money in the appropriation title by the number of 
personnel, and then comparing per person dollars spent within total DoN B/A and also 
within each of the appropriation accounts. Does the number of military and civilian 
employees change as quickly or as slowly as the DoN total B/A and its individual 
appropriations accounts?  This section begins by looking at the raw data to get a picture 
of the actual changes occurring.  Then it examines at the real change in dollar amount per 
person using the DoN and Marine Corps active duty personnel and then just the DoN 
civilians.  Over time, one would expect the proportions to vary in response to 
environmental and managerial actions, the overall size of the DoN B/A and the DoN 
appropriation titles.  Do all appropriation titles per capita move as the top line budgets 
move or is there evidence of one or two per capita accounts growing faster or slower than 
the other appropriation accounts?  In this section, that analysis begins with an 
examination of the overall DoN spending per capita by appropriation title with Navy and 
Marine Corps personnel only. 
1. Navy and Marine Corps Only Per Capita Spending 
In Table 8, during the period of declining budgets, the MILPERS B/A dollars per 
person still had a positive real change of 7.5%.  Looking specifically at the table, the 
DoN MILPERS account declined from $51 billion in 1985 to $38.5 billion in 1998 and 
still had a 4.36% increase in its MILPERS B/A dollars per person.  The Navy decreased 
its ranks by 189,000 troops, while the Marine Corps let 25,000 Marines out of the 
service.  In 1985, the MILPERS B/A dollars per person were $66,401 per person, and in 
1998 the MILPERS B/A dollars per person was $69,295. Therefore, even though the 
MILPERS account went down by almost 25%, there was still an increase of 4.36% 
MILPERS B/A dollars per person. 
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DoN B/A in CY2010$'s (in Millions) 1975 1985 1998 2010
MILPERS $37,200 $51,063 $38,459 $46,172
O&M $39,653 $57,080 $38,376 $50,885
Procurement $31,526 $57,826 $23,744 $45,359
RDT&E $9,888 $15,781 $9,645 $19,770
% Real Change (in DoN B/A)
MILPERS 37.3% -24.7% 20.1%
O&M 43.9% -32.8% 32.6%
Procurement 83.4% -58.9% 91.0%
RDT&E 59.6% -38.9% 105.0%
Number of Personnel 
Navy & Marine Corps 731,000 769,000 555,000 526,000
DoN Civilians 326,000 353,000 210,000 199,000
% Real Change (in Number of Personnel)
Navy & Marine Corps 5.2% -27.8% -5.2%
DoN Civilians 8.3% -40.5% -5.2%
Actual Gain/Loss in Personnel
Navy & Marine Corps 38,000 -214,000 -29,000
DoN Civilians 27,000 -143,000 -11,000
Actual DoN B/A $'s per Person by Category
MILPERS B/A $'s per person (Navy and Marine) $50,889 $66,401 $69,296 $87,780
O&M B/A$'s per person (Navy and Marine) $54,244 $74,226 $69,145 $96,739
PROCUREMENT B/A $'s per person (Navy and Marine) $43,100 $75,190 $42,800 $86,200
RDT&E B/A $'s per person (Navy and Marine) $13,500 $20,520 $17,370 $37,600
O&M B/A$'s per person (Civilian) $121,634 $161,699 $182,741 $255,702
PROCUREMENT B/A $'s per person (Civilian) $96,700 $163,800 $113,100 $227,900
RDT&E B/A $'s per person (Civilian) $30,300 $44,700 $45,900 $99,000
% Real Change (in B/A$'s per person)
MILPERS B/A $'s per person (Navy and Marine) 30.5% 4.4% 26.7%
O&M B/A$'s per person (Navy and Marine) 36.8% -6.8% 39.9%
PROCUREMENT B/A $'s per person (Navy and Marine) 74.4% -43.1% 101.6%
RDT&E B/A $'s per person (Navy and Marine) 51.7% -15.3% 116.3%
O&M B/A$'s per person (Civilian) 32.9% 13.0% 39.9%
PROCUREMENT B/A $'s per person (Civilian) 69.4% -31.0% 101.6%
RDT&E B/A $'s per person (Civilian) 47.4% 2.7% 116.3%
Navy, Marine Corps and DoN Civilian B/A$'s per Capita Changes in B/A, Percentage and Personnel
 
Table 8.   Per Capita Changes (From Comptroller, 2010) 
Table 8 also contains the breakdown of the real percent change (per active duty 
Navy and Marine Corps personnel) gained or lost in the total DoN B/A and the individual 
appropriation categories over the three identified periods. 
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It is apparent that during the two periods of increasing budgets, the per capita 
trends follow the Navy’s top line trends very consistently, and during the period of 
declining budgets, the trend continues, with exception of MILPERS B/A dollars per 
person.  From 1975 to 1985, the U.S. Navy grew modestly from 535,000 to 571,000 
sailors, while the U.S. Marine Corps grew from 196,000 to 198,000, which is a 6% and 
1% growth respectively, despite a total DoN B/A dollars growth of 53% per person and a 
31% growth in DoN MILPERS B/A dollars per person.  In CY2010 dollars, the total 
DoN B/A grew from $119.6 billion dollars in 1975 to $196.8 billion dollars in 1985, 
which is a 62% increase, while the Navy and the Marine Corps personnel only grew by 
6% and 1% respectively. 
As mentioned earlier, for many people in the acquisition realm, the 1980s were 
the procurement “heyday,” and from Table 8 one can see that during the first period the 
Procurement B/A dollars per person is the largest real growth account for the DoN.  One 
can see the distribution of growth across all appropriation accounts is quite even during 
the first period of growth.  However, during the second period of growth the 
Procurement, RDT&E, and MILCON B/A dollars per person far outpace the MILPERS 
and O&M B/A dollars per person.  This could be a result of fewer Navy and Marine 
personnel in uniform or the fact that those investment appropriation accounts received a 
larger per capita slice of the total DoN B/A pie. 
2. DoN Civilian Only Per Capita Spending 
Table 8 also provides a breakdown of the real percent change (per DoN Civilian 
personnel only) gained or lost in the total DoN B/A and the individual appropriation 
categories over the three identified periods.  The table investigates the real percent 
change with respect to the DoN Civilian personnel only. 
Despite nearly a 40% cut to the overall DoN’s B/A from 1985 to 1998, there is 
only one appropriation category (Procurement) that was cut enough to show a negative 
per capita decrease with respect to DoN civilian personnel in the period of declining DoN 
B/A.  The DoN civilian personnel went from 353,000 employees in 1985 to 210,000 
employees in 1998; this is a 40.5% reduction in the number of DoN civilian employees 
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over the intervening time of declining budgets.  In CY2010 dollars, the DoN Procurement 
B/A declined from $57.8 billion in 1985 to $23.7 billion in 1998, which is a 57% 
decrease and was the only appropriation account that took a deep enough cut to show a 
negative growth per capita when compared to DoN Civilian employees.  All the other 
appropriation accounts experienced a smaller cut in their budgets, as compared per capita 
to DoN Civilians.  Looking at one example, in CY2010 dollars, the 1985 DoN’s O&M 
B/A was $57.1 billion dollars.  There were 353,000 DoN civilian employees in 1985, 
which equates to $161,756 O&M B/A dollars per DoN civilian employee in 1985.  The 
1998 DoN’s O&M B/A was $38.4 billion dollars, and there were 210,000 DoN civilian 
employees.  In CY2010 dollars, that equates to $182,857 O&M B/A dollars per DoN 
civilian employee in 1998.  Therefore, there is a 13% increase in real DoN O&M B/A 
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VI. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT 
Since the establishment of the United States Navy, ships and aircraft have been 
the cornerstone of naval readiness and the key element of maintaining sea and air 
superiority for the United States.  Different categories of ships and aircraft project power 
around the world. Over the past thirty years, the Navy has used technology to enhance the 
capabilities of its ships and aircraft. However, budget constraints and rapid advancements 
in technology have motivated the Navy to reduce its number of ships and aircraft to 
maintain its mission readiness and supremacy. These factors have budgetary and force 
structure implications. This chapter examines the Navy’s budgets during the three 
periods, with a focus on ships and aircraft. The first section examines the pattern of 
Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) and total DoN budget authority, along with the 
total number of Navy ships. It also presents data on the structure that comprises the total 
number of Navy ships. The second section examines total DoN B/A, Aircraft 
Procurement Navy (APN) against the total number of aircraft.  Then it explores the 
different categories of aircraft and their structure. In doing so, for the section identifies 
trends within and across the three periods and provides evidence of these factors. 
A. STRUCTURE OF DoN SHIPS 
According to the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, the future fleet 
should have at least 313 ships. There is always a call for replenishment of the fleet. On 
average, most ships, other than aircraft carriers, last around 30 years. This means the 
Navy would have to build more than 12 ships every year during the next 18 years, at an 
estimated annual cost of $23 billion to $25 billion, to reach that goal.  Today, the DoN 
has 287 active ships. While the array of capabilities in the fleet is critical, so is the 
number of platforms. A ship only can be in one place at one time, and with global 
responsibilities increasing, the Navy must deploy an ever-growing percentage of its ships 
at any given time to meet security requirements.  
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One way to measure the capabilities of a navy is to count the number of ships and 
breakdown the different types of ships in its inventory. One may also consider the 
changes in the type of ships a navy has over time. Over time, one would expect the 
distribution of ship type and size to vary in response to technological advances, the 
overall amount of the DoN budget, and its allocation of SCN B/A. Does the total number 
of ships move in response to DoN budgets and SCN, or does it move based on 
advancements in technology? Moreover, have such factors influenced the structure of the 
naval ship force consistently in each of the three periods under study?  In this section, 
that analysis begins with a look at the DoN B/A, its SCN B/A allocation, and its 
relationship to the total number of Navy Ships. 
1. Analysis of DoN B/A, SCN and Total # of Naval Ships (1975–2010) 
Figure 11 displays the change in total DoN B/A, Shipbuilding and Conversion 











































DoN Total B/A vs. SCN vs. # of Navy Ships
DON Total B/A (divided by10) (LHS) SCN (LHS) # of SHIPS (RHS)
 
Figure 11.  DoN B/A vs. SCN vs. # of Ships (From Comptroller 2010; Federal 
Budget 1975–2010; Naval Historical Center, 2010) 
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It is clearly illustrated that the total number of ships in the DoN does not vary 
consistently with its top line budget or its SCN B/A. If it did, one would expect to see the 
line trend upward on the two sides and trend downward in the middle. Clearly, that is not 
the pattern, the number of ships and DoN and SCN B/A lines are roughly parallel during 
the first two periods, but during the third period, they have opposite slopes. 
Figure 11 shows that the total number of ships rose during the first period of 
budget growth from 559 to 571 along with DoN B/A and SCN. However, the total 
number of ships increased by only 2%, while SCN increased by 95% and DoN B/A 
increased by 62%. Steep increases in B/A led to a small increase in forces during this 
period of sustained growth. During the intervening period of decline, all three decreased, 
with total number of ships peaking in 1987 at 594. This peak lags two years behind the 
peak of the DoN B/A, which peaks in 1985. This is close to the same time that the DoN 
personnel peaked in 1988. After its peak in 1987, the total number of ships fell steadily 
through the third period, despite an increase in both DoN B/A and SCN by 42% from 
1998–2010. During this period of growth, the total number of Navy ships decreased by 
16% from 344 to 287.  
Readiness measures the ability of a military unit, such as a carrier battle group, to 
accomplish its assigned mission. Logistics, available spare parts, training, equipment, and 
morale, which are a part of Operations and Maintenance, all contribute to readiness. 
Advancements in technology and the methods of shipbuilding have decreased the need 
for a large number of ships to maintain the Navy’s readiness.  
The increases in capabilities of ships to perform and complete missions have 
contributed to a decrease in ships since 1987. The increase in capabilities does not come 
without cost. Over the past 30 years of shipbuilding and conversion, the DoN, on 
average, has spent approximately $13 billion dollars a year on new ships and conversions 
for older ships, including refueling nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines.  The average 
real cost of Navy ships has increased, outpacing Pentagon projections and growing from 
$1.2 billion during the 1980s to at least $2.5 billion in 2009.  
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During this last period of budget growth, the Navy built an average of 5.4 ships 
annually, and its annual shipbuilding budget is now about $11 billion. An elevated cost 
per ship reduces the possible number of ships that purchased each year. The average cost 
of a Navy ship has increased from $1.2 billion in the 1980s to, according to the DoN 
2011 shipbuilding plan, $2.5 billion per ship, and the DoN had expectations of 
purchasing 9.9 ships per year.  All dollar amounts are in CY2010 dollars. 
During the second period of sustained growth (1998–2010), the number of ships 
purchased on average each year declined from 17.2 to 6.0.  With the rising prices of labor 
and materials, as well as the escalating prices of ships, the DoN purchased fewer ships. 
Yet, the shipbuilding industry still has fixed overhead costs that it must allocate to fewer 
and fewer units of sales (CBO Pub. No. 4069, 2010).  
2.  Analysis of Naval Ship Distribution (1975–2010) 
Figure 12 displays the change in the total number of naval ships by category 
across all three periods (1975–1985, 1985–1998, and 1998–2010).  Table 9 depicts the 
actual number of ships at a given point in time that correlates to either the beginning or 










































Figure 12.  Number of Ships by Category (From Naval Historical Center, 2010) 
 
1975 1985 1998 2010
Carriers 15 13 12 11
Surface Warships 193 211 109 113
Submarines 116 137 83 71
Amphibious 64 58 40 37
Other 171 152 100 55
Total # of Ships 559 571 344 287
Actual Number of DoN Ships
 
Table 9.   Actual Number of Ships Per Category 
Figure 13 displays the change in the total number of naval ships by category 
across all three periods (1975–1985, 1985–1998, and 1998–2010). Table 10 is a 
breakdown of real percentage changes gained or lost in the individual categories over the 













































# of Ships (RHS) Carriers (LHS) Surface War Ships (LHS)
Submarines (LHS) Amphibious (LHS) Other (LHS)
 




Carriers ‐13.3% ‐2 Carriers ‐7.7% ‐1 Carriers ‐8.3% ‐1
Surface War Ships 9.3% 18 Surface War Ships ‐48.3% ‐102 Surface War Ships 3.7% 4
Submarines 18.1% 21 Submarines ‐39.4% ‐54 Submarines ‐14.5% ‐12
Amphibious ‐9.4% ‐6 Amphibious ‐31.0% ‐18 Amphibious ‐7.5% ‐3
Other ‐11.1% ‐19 Other ‐34.2% ‐52 Other ‐8.0% ‐8




Table 10.   Real Growth in # of Ships by Category and SCN (From Federal Budget 1975–
2010, Naval Historical Center) 
The allocation of ships changes across all three periods.  During the first period, 
the increase in warships and submarines stands out.  During the Cold War, it was 
important to have an increase in the two categories that were the most necessary to 
counter Soviet sea power.  There was direct relationship to SCN.  The second period saw 
a draw down throughout all categories of ships in response to the end of the Cold War.   
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The third period is different in that SCN showed a 42% growth, while ships in 4 
out of the 5 categories decreased in numbers.  There was a spike in surface warships in 
2000, and there was a reclassification to include active commissioned ships, those in the 
Naval Reserve Force (NRF), and ships operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC).  
Two different criteria are responsible for the decrease in total number of ships. First, the 
state of the world at that time was changing.  To be more specific, the United States 
dominated the sea, and the mindset moved to ground warfare.  Therefore, there was a 
reduction in number of ships needed.  Secondly, there was a significant increase in 
technology aboard ships.  The increase in technology gave each ship an increased 
capability, and this meant that it took fewer ships to do the same jobs or complete the 
same missions than it did before.  
As stated earlier, the numbers of surface warships has increased, while the 
numbers of other ships, including the tankers and supply ships that support the warships 
continue to decline. If this trend continues, the long-term implications are that the Navy 
will need fewer supportive ships, and the total number of ships will continue to fall.  The 
consistency of the distribution of naval ships indicates that regardless of the total number 
of ships, distribution will remain the same.  
B. STRUCTURE OF DoN AIRCRAFT 
Another way to measure the capability of the DoN is to count the number and 
different type/model/series (T/M/S) of aircraft. Over time, one would expect the 
distribution of the aircraft T/M/S of the DoN to vary in response to technological 
advances, the overall amount of the DoN budget, and its allocation of APN B/A. Does the 
total number of aircraft move in response to DoN budgets and APN, or does it move 
based on advancements in technology? In addition, have such factors affected the 
structure of the naval air service consistently in each of the three periods under study?  
This section analyzes the DoN B/A, its APN B/A allocation, and its relationship to the 
total number of Naval Aircraft.   
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1. Analysis of DoN B/A, APN and Total # of Naval A/C (1975–2010) 
Figure 14 displays the change in total DoN B/A, Aircraft Procurement, Navy 











































DoN Total B/A vs. APN vs. # of Navy A/C
APN (LHS) DoN Total B/A (divided by 10) (LHS) # of DoN Aircraft (RHS)
 
Figure 14.  DoN B/A vs. APN vs. # of A/C 
It is apparent that the total number of aircraft in the DoN does not follow along 
with the top line budget for the Navy or its APN B/A. If it did, one would expect to see 
the line trend upward on the two sides and trend downward in the middle. Figure 14 
shows that the total number of aircraft continually declines through all three periods from 
7526 to 3848 aircraft. Both The DoN B/A and APN act in a typical fashion and increase 
during both periods of growth. During the intervening period of decline, all three 
decreased. There was a spike in the number of aircraft in 1989 and 1990, but the steady 
fall continued through the third period, despite an increase in both DoN B/A and APN of 
139.5% from 1998–2010. During this period of growth, the total number of Navy aircraft 
decreased from 4100 to 3848, which is a 6% decline. 
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As stated earlier, measuring the ability of a military unit, such as an air wing, to 
accomplish its assigned mission is the definition of readiness. Advancements in 
technology and aircraft design have decreased the need for a large number of aircraft to 
complete the Navy’s mission requirements. The increase in aircraft capabilities to 
perform and complete missions has also contributed to the decrease in A/C since 1975. 
Increasing capabilities is never cheap.  The cost of aircraft is ever increasing, and it has 
led the DoN, as well as the DoD, to reevaluate some of the programs that are currently 
being considered or already underway.  The eventual cost of these aircraft programs and 
the number of aircraft can have a significant effect on the Navy's ability to maintain and 
expand its forces.  
2. Analysis of Naval Aircraft Distribution (1975–2010) 
Figure 15 displays the total number and distribution of naval aircraft by category 
across all three periods (1975–1985, 1985–1998, and 1998–2010). Table 11 and 12 are a 
breakdown of both the actual number of A/C at certain points in time and the real 


































Numbers of A/C by Category
# of DoN A/C (RHS) Combat A/C (LHS) Transport/Util. (LHS) R/W (LHS)
 
Figure 15.  Number of A/C by Category 
 
1975 1985 1998 2010
Combat A/C 2747 2067 1437 1320
Transport/Utility 377 183 615 577
Observation 52 73 23 4
Rotary Wing 1134 1224 1384 1254
Other (Training/Miscellaneous) 3216 1849 641 693
Total # of A/C 7526 5396 4100 3848
Actual Number of DoN Ships
 




Combat A/C ‐24.8% ‐30.5% ‐8.1%
Transport/Utility ‐51.5% 236.1% ‐6.2%
Observation 40.4% ‐68.5% ‐82.6%
Rotary Wing 7.9% 13.1% ‐9.4%
Other (Training/Miscellaneous) ‐42.5% ‐65.3% 8.1%
Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN)  76.7% ‐56.2% 139.5%
Real Change in Distribution of DoN A/C over the 3 time periods
 
Table 12.   Real Growth in # of A/C by Category and APN 
The distribution of Navy aircraft categories changes across all three periods. 
During the first period of the growth, the percentage for each category is flat with only a 
slight increase in rotary wing aircraft.  This does not match the downward slope of the 
total number of aircraft or follow the 76% increase in Aircraft Procurement (APN) funds.  
The second period shows some movement that is counter to both the DoN Total B/A and 
APN.  APN declined by 56% during this period, even as combat aircraft spiked from 
1987–1993, transport and utility aircraft increased by 236%, and rotary wing a/c 
increased by 13.1%.  The one period that stands out is the third period of growth, 1998–
2010. As the total number of ships in all categories was shrinking, the DoN Aircraft 
procurement actually increased 139%, from 6.5 billion to 15.4 billion. The distribution of 
naval aircraft within the total number of DoN Aircraft across all three periods is very 
consistent.  Although there was a decline across the board for the four major categories of 
A/C, the distribution of different aircraft remains flat. 
During the third period, even as the DoN participates in a time of war, the number 
of aircraft continues to decrease. However, both the DoN Total B/A and APN are rising 
at a rapid rate. If this trend continues, the long-term implications are that the Navy will 
continue to develop aircraft with increased capabilities, will need fewer aircraft, and the 
total numbers will continue to fall.  The consistency of the distribution of A/C indicates 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This purpose of this study was to look at these periods of growth and decline with 
respect to DoN funding allocations and force structure. This thesis attempts to answer 
two primary questions.  First, what insights can a comparative analysis of two periods of 
sustained budget growth and an interceding period of budget decline for the DoN 
provide?  Second, what were the changes in the DoN’s budget allocations, and what were 
their effects on force structure?  Dividing the DoN’s budget into three time-periods 
provides deeper insight into relationships and changes during periods of sustained budget 
growth and decline.  
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PERIODS OF SUSTAINED GROWTH 
AND DECLINE 
During the first period of budget growth (1975–1985), the relationship between 
DoN’s budget authority and force-structure was relatively consistent; as the DoN’s top 
line increased, so did each appropriation and each facet of the DoN’s force structure, with 
the exception of aircraft.   
The DoN’s total budget authority during the period 1975–1985 increased from 
$120 billion to $194 billion (or by 62%). The amount of budget authority allocated to 
MILPERS, O&M and RDT&E all rose at the same time as total DoN B/A, but at a lesser 
rate, 37%, 44%, and 48%. The amount allocated to Procurement rose by 83% and peaked 
in 1983 at $64 billion, which is much faster than the DoN top line. In 1982 Procurement 
became the appropriation with the highest B/A and remained elevated throughout the rest 
of the period, which is not unexpected considering the United States was looking to 
rebuild its force structure by appropriating more funds for investment.  What is noticeable 
is that this period was marked by investment and increase in force structure, with 
Procurement and RDT&E having the greatest rate of change. When analyzing investment 
accounts during this period, it is notable that RDT&E grew at a slower rate than 
Procurement.   
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Between 1985 and 1998, the DoN’s total budget authority decreased from $194 
billion to $119 billion (or by 38.6%). The amount allocated to MILPERS and O&M both 
declined at the same time as total DoN B/A, but at a lesser rate 24% and 33% 
respectively versus 38.6% by total DoN B/A. In 1989, MILPERS became the 
appropriation with the highest B/A and remained the highest throughout the period. The 
amount allocated to Procurement and RDT&E declined by 59% and 39% respectively, 
this is faster the DoN top line. Total DoN B/A and force structure both move inversely to 
the first period, with the exception of aircraft which remain constant across both periods. 
During the second period as total DoN B/A and appropriation decrease so does the DoN’s 
force structure; the Navy used fewer ships, aircraft, and personnel. This period of budget 
decline bridges the gap between the two periods of sustained growth and the most recent 
periods of sustained U.S. military wartime deployments: the Vietnam War and the Global 
War on Terrorism. 
During the second period of budget growth (1998–2010), the relationship between 
DoN’s budget authority and force structure is remarkably different from that observed in 
1975–1985. As the DoN’s top line increased, along with each appropriation, each facet of 
the DoN’s force structure declined.  Between 1998 and 2010, the DoN’s total budget 
authority increased from $119 billion to $169 billion (or by 42%). The amount allocated 
to MILPERS rose at the same time as total DoN B/A, but at a lesser rate (20% vs. 42%). 
The amount allocated to O&M also rose at a lesser rate during this period (32% vs. 42%) 
despite O&M having the appropriation with the greatest amount of budget authority in 
1999. The O&M account remained elevated throughout the period, which is not 
surprising considering the cost associated with supporting the Navy’s expensive 
technologically advanced equipment, and the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In the first period of budget growth (1975–1985), Procurement received the most budget 
authority, followed by O&M and MILPERS. In this period of budget growth, O&M 
received the highest level of budget authority followed by MILPERS and Procurement. 
The amount of B/A allocated to both Procurement and RDT&E rose at much faster rates 
than the total DoN B/A, 91% and 105%, respectively.  
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Across all three periods, when the DoN’s total budget authority increases all 
appropriations tend to peak along with the DoN top line. The one exception was the 
amount of funding allocated to Procurement, which attains its maximum and minimum 
two years prior to the high and low points of DoN B/A top line. Procurement is the only 
appropriation whose allocation increases and decreases at a rate faster than total DoN 
B/A across all three periods. This may indicate that Procurement is more volatile than the 
other appropriations. During the first period of budget growth, the DoN had a slower 
growth in Procurement and RDT&E but an increase in force structure. During this period 
Procurement peaks in 1983 and RDT&E lags two years later and peaks at the end of the 
period, 1985.  However, during the second period of growth Procurement and RDT&E 
had a much faster rate of growth but force structure decreased. During this period, 
Procurement lags one year behind RDT&E peaking in 2008, while RDT&E peaks in 
2007.  This likely indicates that because of information technology advances, the DoN is 
allocating more and more of its funds into the testing and development phases of the 
acquisition process, which prolongs the production and procurement of equipment such 
as ships and aircraft. Overall, when decision makers are looking to allocate funds in the 
DoN’s B/A, historical data shows that Procurement and RDT&E have been to the 
accounts to experience the most dramatic increases and decreases.  MILPERS and O&M 
accounts, according to historical data, tend to be relatively less affected by changes to the 
top line.  
As SCN and APN are the means of funding for the Navy’s ships and aircraft, the 
total number of ships and aircraft lags behind the increases in those appropriations. The 
SCN account peaks in 1983 at $27 billion, while the number of ships finally peaks in 
1989 at 592. The time it takes to develop and build ships explains this lag time.  The APN 
account and the total number of aircraft move in opposite directions. The total number of 
aircraft peaks in 1975, when the APN is at its lowest point of $8 billion. The number total 
of aircraft is at its lowest point in 2010 at 3,848 A/C, when the APN peaks at $19 billion. 
The peak in aircraft stretches back from early strategic bombing campaigns used in 
WWII and Vietnam. The DoN purged inventories throughout all three periods due to 
consolidation of aircraft mission types and aging aircraft. Since then, either the Navy is 
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performing its mission with fewer aircraft, which may indicate that aircraft are being 
assigned fewer missions or they are comparatively more capable to complete required 
missions.  Today much of the naval aviation is ship/carrier-based.  As the size of the fleet 
decreases, so does the number of the aircraft. 
Throughout the first period of growth (1975–1985), the total number of Navy 
ships and personnel move with the appropriation accounts in the same direction, which 
coincides with the top line DoN B/A.  The number of aircraft, however, moves in the 
opposite direction. The pattern changes in the third period (1998–2010), when 
appropriations increase without a corresponding increase in the number of ships and 
personnel.  The number of aircraft, however, continues to decline during this period.  
Cost growth is another factor contributing to fielding fewer ships and aircraft. The 
average cost of a Navy ship has increased from $1.2 billion in the 1980s to an estimated 
$2.7 billion dollars per ship in 2011 in real dollars. During the same period, the number 
of ships purchased on average each year has declined from 17.2 to 6.0. Like ships, 
aircraft have steadily increased in cost and capability, which directly reflects the decrease 
in their numbers over the years. Another factor to take into consideration for the rise in 
prices of ships and aircraft is that there is a diminished industrial capacity within the U.S. 
and therefore less competition between private companies to introduce cost effectiveness 
measures.  Over time, the distribution of ship and aircraft types vary in response to 
technological advances, the overall amount of the DoN budget, and its allocation of 
procurement funding. This analysis found that during the third period, even as the DoN 
engaged in a war, its number of ships and aircraft continued to decrease, despite a rising 
top line.  If this trend continues, the long-term implications are that the Navy will 
continue to develop ships and aircraft with increased capabilities and therefore potentially 
require fewer numbers.  
Throughout the first two periods (1975–1985) and (1985–1998), as the DoN’s top 
line B/A increased and decreased the O&M and MILPERS accounts followed. The total 
number of civilians and uniformed military personnel follows as well. This pattern 
changes in the third period (1998–2010) where the appropriations accounts increase 
without a corresponding increase in the number of uniformed personnel and civilians. 
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During this period, MILPERS grew by 20% despite a 5% decrease in military personnel. 
O&M grew by 33% despite a 5% decrease in civilian personnel. MILPERS B/A dollars 
per person increased at a faster rate than the actual MILPERS account (27% vs. 20%).  
Across all three periods, the total number of DoN uniformed personnel increased 
and decreased by 5%, -28% and -5% respectively. MILPERS increased and decreased by, 
37%, -25% and 20% respectively. During the first period of growth, MILPERS increases 
at a faster rate than total DoN Personnel does. This is inversely different from the second 
period of growth where as MILPERS increased, despite the total DoN Personnel 
decreased. The MILPERS B/A dollars per person increased from approximately $50,000 
in 1975 to $87,000 in 2010. The MILPERS B/A dollars per person increases across all 
three periods by 31%, 4% and 27% respectively indicating real growth in military 
personnel wages. Therefore, there is some evidence that because of the increase in 
MILPERS B/A dollars per person the DoN is paying higher wages to more educated and 
qualified personnel who are able to perform multiple tasks on highly complex weapons 
and operating systems. This increase in wages and personnel becoming more educated, 
along with the benefit and use of cross training, elucidates to the decline in DoN 
Personnel observed in the second period of growth.   
During the first period of sustained growth (1975–1985), the percent of DoN 
uniformed personnel that were officers rose from 11.5% to 12%. During the second 
period of growth (1998–2010), it rose from 13.2% to 14.1%. This may be some evidence 
of “brass creep,” but the phenomenon was primarily limited to the Navy. The more 
officers the Navy has, the higher the payroll must be.   
The relationship between O&M and total DoN Civilians is similar to MILPERS 
and total DoN uniformed personnel. Across all three periods, the total number of DoN 
Civilians increased and decreased by, 8%, -41% and -5% respectively. The O&M 
account increased and decreased by 43%, -33% and 33% respectively. During the first 
period of growth, O&M increases at a faster rate than total DoN Civilians do. Like 
MILPERS and uniformed personnel, this is inversely different from the second period of 
growth where as O&M increased and total DoN Civilians decrease. Of all the personnel 
in the DoN, civilians comprised 44.6% in 1975, grew modestly to 45.9% in 1985, fell to 
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37.8% in 1998. There has been no change during this most recent period of budget 
growth.  There has been a steady rise in the payroll for General Schedule (GS) 
employees, who perform managerial and administrative tasks similar to those done by the 
officer corps or senior non-commissioned officers, since 1981.  In addition, there has 
been evidence that wage board workers are more prone to outsourcing, and GS workers 
were more likely to substitute for military personnel, which creates a drop in active duty 
members.  Because of the many factors that make up the O&M account there is not a 
clear and concise way to determine that this relationship indicates a real growth in 
civilian wages. 
As this study shows, the two periods of budget growth (1975–1985 and 1998–
2010) are similar in some respects but vastly different in many other areas.  The second 
period of growth is marked by a 42% increase in B/A, yet the force structure is shrinking.  
The period of budget decline, 1985–1998, shows a steady decline across all 
appropriations and force structure that falls in line with the total DoN B/A.   Due to rising 
force structure cost, advancements in technology, staffing, and advancing product 
development the DoN’s future is yet to be told. As the Navy heads into the next decade, 
the differences in the periods of sustained growth may possibly provide insights into the 
perceived period of declining DoD and DoN B/A and force structure.  The force structure 
at the end of this period of growth and allocations in the DoN Appropriations accounts 
may not be able to allow for a similar period of decline to that of (1985–1998).  Therefore 
the responsiveness of the Procurement and RDT&E accounts may not be as evident in the 
future declining DoD and DoN B/A.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Comparing two periods of sustained budget growth and an interceding period of 
budget decline for the Department of the Navy over the past 35 years is an inherently 
daunting and detailed task considering the complexity and size of its budget.  Future 
research into this subject should take into account of the following concerns:  
 
  65
Consistency of Data—There have been many policy shifts, not only to accounting 
styles, but also in the way things (ships, aircraft, submarines, people, appropriation titles, 
accounts within appropriation titles) are all labeled, tracked, and accounted for within the 
DoD and the DoN. 
Aircraft/Ship Inventory—Changes in Type, Model, Series of aircraft and re-
categorizing of ships, makes finding consistent historical inventories challenging.  
There are many reasons that link the movement of budget authority to 
environmental issues such as cost of technology, industrial challenges, and combat 
operations and personnel concerns.  Research to understand these issues and provide 
concrete evidence to the validity of these causes would be beneficial. 
Another area of research is future implications for both the DoD and DoN.  What 
will the next period of decline look like in current trends continue?  What if the next 
period of decline looks like the last period of decline, what will the military force 
structure look like?  Can the data lead to a forecast of next period of decline?  More 
research into what the future budgets or appropriation trends would look like could also 
prove interesting. 
Future theses may want to look into the following questions: 
 Are force structure trends consistent throughout the entire DoD 
infrastructure, specifically, does Department of the Army (DoA) and 
Department of the Air Force (DoAF) follow the same trends as DoN 
within those three periods?  
  Looking at the DoN Budget authority by appropriation titles, does DoN 
follow the same trends within DoD budget authority appropriations titles, 
and, more specifically, do DoA and DoAF follow the same trends within 
their appropriation titles? 
 If the current trends continue, of what can the DoN expect its future 
budget authority and force structure to consist?  
All of these questions and many more with respect to budget authority over the 
same three periods will provide a better understanding of purchasing power and shifts 
within the DoD to provide a more capable and better-utilized defense network. 
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APPENDIX.  DEFINITIONS 
Appropriation:  Budget authority to incur obligations and to make payments from 
the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation act is the most common means of 
providing appropriations; however, authorizing and other legislation itself may provide 
appropriations (Walker, 2005).   
Budget Authority:  Authority provided by federal law to enter into financial 
obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays involving federal government 
funds. The basic forms of budget authority include (1) appropriations, (2) borrowing 
authority, (3) contract authority, and (4) authority to obligate and expend offsetting 
receipts and collections. Budget authority includes the credit subsidy cost for direct loan 
and loan guarantee programs, but does not include the underlying authority to insure or 
guarantee the repayment of indebtedness incurred by another person or government.  
Budget authority may be classified by its duration (1-year, multiple-year, or no-year), by 
the timing provided in the legislation (current or permanent), by the manner of 
determining the amount available (definite or indefinite), or by its availability for new 
obligations (Walker, 2005).  
Consumer Price Index:  A measure of the average change over time in the prices 
paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services commonly 
referred to as “inflation.” Measures for two population groups are currently published, 
CPI-U and CPI-W. CPI-U is based on a market basket determined by expenditure 
patterns of all urban households, while the market basket for CPI-W is determined by 
expenditure patterns of only urban wage earner and clerical-worker families. The urban 
wage earner and clerical-worker population consists of clerical workers, sales workers, 
craft workers, operatives, service workers, and laborers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
publishes both indexes monthly. The CPI is used to adjust for inflation, the income 
payments of Social Security beneficiaries, and payments made by other programs. In 
addition, the CPI is used to adjust certain amounts defined by the tax code, such as 
personal exemptions and the tax brackets (Walker, 2005). 
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Current Dollars:  “In current dollars” means valued in the prices of the current 
year. The current dollar value of a good or service is its value in terms of prices current at 
the time the good or service is acquired or sold (Walker, 2005).   
Deficit:  The amount by which the governments’ spending exceeds its revenues 
for a given period, usually a fiscal year (opposite of surplus) (Walker, 2005). 
Deflator:  An index used to adjust a current dollar amount to its real dollar 
counterpart, that is, to remove the effects of inflation. (Walker, 2005)   
Expense Accounts:  For the purposes of this research paper expense accounts will 
consist of adding MILPERS and O&M money together to define an expense to the DOD 
and the federal budget.  
Full Time Equivalent:  Reflects the total number of regular straight-time hours 
(i.e., not including overtime or holiday hours) worked by employees divided by the 
number of compensable hours applicable to each fiscal year. Annual leave, sick leave, 
and compensatory time off and other approved leave categories are considered to be 
“hours worked” for purposes of defining FTE employment (Walker, 2005).   
Gross Domestic Product:  The value of all final goods and services produced 
within the borders of a country such as the United States in a given period, whether 
produced by residents or nonresidents. The components of GDP are personal 
consumption expenditures, gross private domestic investment, net exports of goods and 
services, and government consumption expenditures and gross investment. That value is 
conceptually equal to the sum of incomes generated within the borders of the country in 
the same time period (Walker, 2005). 
Inflation Adjusted Dollars:  A dollar value adjusted to remove the effects of 
inflation by dividing the nominal value (also called the current dollar value) by the 
appropriate price index. The resulting amount can be labeled real or inflation adjusted. 
Real dollar values can reflect a measure of purchasing power, such as real income, or a 
measure of quantity, such as real GDP. Real dollar is frequently called constant dollar 
when referring to measures of purchasing power (Walker, 2005).  
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Investment Account:  For the purpose of this research paper, investment accounts 
will consist of adding RDT&E, Procurement and MILCON money together to define an 
investment to the DOD and the federal budget. 
Outlay:  The issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of 
funds made to liquidate a federal obligation. Outlays also occur when interest on the 
Treasury debt held by the public accrues and when the government issues bonds, notes, 
debentures, monetary credits, or other cash-equivalent instruments in order to liquidate 
obligations. Also, under credit reform, the credit subsidy cost is recorded as an outlay 
when a direct or guaranteed loan is disbursed. An outlay is not recorded for repayment of 
debt principal, disbursements to the public by federal credit programs for direct loan 
obligations and loan guarantee commitments made in fiscal year 1992 or later, 
disbursements from deposit funds, and refunds of receipts that result from overpayments 
(Walker, 2005). 
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